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ZAmbIA’s soCIAl polICy response to CovId-19:  
proteCtIng the poorest or polItICAl survIvAl?
Kate Pruce*
AbstrAct
Zambia’s social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic is unfolding against a background of severe financial 
challenges, a squeezed social sector and limited state capacity. There are also concerns about the upcoming 
general election in August 2021, which is already beginning to shape policy and spending decisions. Much of 
Zambia’s social policy response has focused on the formal sector, despite the country’s large informal sector, high 
unemployment rate and food insecurity across urban and rural areas. A Covid-19 emergency cash transfer (ECT) 
has been the most significant social policy intervention to help the poorest households to cope with the effects 
of the pandemic. However, this programme has been largely driven and funded by international donors, while 
the government has increased payments to agricultural subsidies and empowerment funds. Claims that the ruling 
party is using the ECT for election rigging suggests that there is some political interest in this scheme, but other 
more powerful constituencies – particularly farmers and young people – continue to be prioritised. This reflects 
the political dynamics of Zambia’s social protection response more broadly, with domestic incentives shaping the 
level of government support and funding directed at various programmes.
IntroductIon
Zambia confirmed its first two cases of Covid-19 on 18 March 2020. A couple who had gone on holiday to 
France tested positive on their return, and quarantined with their children in designated isolation facilities in Lu-
saka. Numbers initially remained low, with just over 1,000 cases and 7 deaths recorded up to the end of May. 
However, the number of confirmed cases more than doubled from 1,489 on 24 June to 3,326 on 21 July (Africa 
News, 2020), coinciding with a predicted spike during Zambia’s cold season.  As of 25 October 2020, the 
official figures stood at 16,137 confirmed cases and 348 deaths classified as Covid-19 or Covid-19 associated 
according to Ministry of Health reports. However, the initial results of a Covid-19 seroprevalence survey suggest 
that up to 1.8 million Zambians may have been infected (UNOCHA, 2020), which would mean that the majority 
of infections are going unreported. Related to this, there are ongoing concerns about the country’s low testing 
capacity (about 1,000 tests per day) and other data limitations such as time lag and sampling strategy.
Covid-19 has arrived at a time of severe financial challenges, a squeezed social sector and limited state 
capacity. Zambia is experiencing negative economic growth, depreciation of the local currency (kwacha) and 
unsustainable debt. Central government debt stood at 91.6 percent of GDP at the end of 2019 (IMF, 2019), and 
the country defaulted on its sovereign debt in November 2020, following the rejection of its request to delay 
payments. With debt servicing and the public sector wage bill taking up a large proportion of the budget, there 
is limited fiscal space for spending on social policies. As a share of the total budget, the social sector budget 
declined from 29.4% in 2019 to 26.1% in 2020 (ZIPAR, 2019). There is a historical backlog of pension arrears, 
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even as the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA) has begun to extend social security, including pensions, 
to informal workers. Zambia’s Covid-19 response has also been limited by inadequate health systems as well as 
poor road infrastructure and safety, particularly in terms of public transport. As a result, the majority of testing is 
taking place in Lusaka and other key hotspots such as Nakonde, on the border with Tanzania.
Zambia gained lower middle income status in 2011, with economic growth averaging 7.4% between 2004 
and 2014 (Smith et al., 2016). However, the economy remains heavily reliant on copper which represents more 
than 70% of exports and the country continues to perform poorly on human development indicators (UN, 2015). 
While the re-introduction of multi-party elections in 1991 has led to two peaceful electoral turnovers, the contin-
ued predominance of patron-client relationships rather than programmatic politics has led to the characterisation 
of Zambia’s political settlement as ‘competitive clientelist’ in nature. In such settings, personalised elite bargaining 
and access to state resources tend to take precedence over the provision of services to citizens (Levy, 2014). A 
more populist element to politics in Zambia has also emerged (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010). Appealing to 
the urban poor, disenfranchised by the previous Movement for Multi-party Democracy government, the Patri-
otic Front (PF) came to power in 2011 with the promise to ‘put money in the pockets of poor people’. The first PF 
president Michael Sata passed away in office in 2014, with Edgar Lungu emerging as his successor following 
an internal factional conflict. Under Lungu, a shift is taking place towards a more authoritarian settlement based 
on highly centralised executive powers, as well as suppression of civil society groups and previously vibrant in-
dependent media houses (Hinfelaar and Sichone, 2019). The ruling PF party is increasingly focused on political 
survival, rather than addressing the economic and health crises.
This essay will discuss Zambia’s social policy response to Covid-19 in the context of these existing challenges 
and also the upcoming general election in August 2021, which is already beginning to shape policy and spend-
ing decisions. Zambia has introduced a wide range of Covid-19 related measures, including micro-economic 
and macro-economic policies which may have implications for social policy. This overview focuses on policy 
developments that are explicitly aimed at social protection in areas such as pensions, education and social as-
sistance, while recognising that there is often overlap between economic and social objectives. Examples of this 
overlap include the provision of targeted economic empowerment funds as well as subsidies, such as the Farmer 
Input Support Programme (FISP) which has been categorised as a social protection programme by the Zambian 
government.
The next section briefly introduces the economic and social effects of Covid-19 on households, as well as 
the broader employment situation in Zambia. It then goes on to outline the government’s initial response to the 
pandemic in Zambia, and the gaps that remained. The final section analyses the politics of the social protection 
response, which appears to be continuing established patterns in terms of government priorities and spending, 
particularly as the 2021 election approaches. Drawing on Lavers and Hickey’s (2016) adapted political settle-
ments framework, which suggests that political commitment to social protection is closely related to the domestic 
political economy, the essay argues that cash transfers remain dwarfed by programmes with more influential 
political constituencies such as FISP. This may explain why Zambia’s Covid-19 emergency cash transfer is largely 
donor-funded, with worrying implications for the many Zambians experiencing income vulnerabilities and food 
insecurity. 
ZAmbIA’s socIAl polIcy response
A study of Covid-19 in Zambia conducted in July 2020 by the University of Gothenburg’s programme on Gov-
ernance and Local Development (GLD) and the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR) 
found that 68% of respondents report their income does not meet their needs, indicating significant income 
vulnerabilities (Metheney et al., 2020). Although women and men appear to be having similar experiences of 
losing jobs (14% of women, 16% of men) and losing income (42% of women, 44% of men), women are actually 
experiencing more negative financial impacts from Covid-19. This is because women are half as likely to have a 
job compared to men. A World Bank survey also found a considerable fall in household income since the start of 
the pandemic and a concerning impact on household food security across urban and rural areas (World Bank, 
2020). The GLD-SAIPAR study identifies a gap between need and assistance with 43% of Zambians in need of 
assistance, while only 16% report receiving help. Types of assistance included financial and health-based, such 
as accessing masks and sanitiser. Family and friends are the most frequent source of assistance (31%), followed 
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by healthcare workers (18%) and employers (15%) (Metheney et al., 2020). The numbers of people turning to 
local councillors and Members of Parliament were much lower – at 9% and 7% respectively – suggesting that 
government programmes have been inadequate, leading people to seek alternative mechanisms of support.
Zambia has a very high level of informal employment, where the job holder is not entitled to any social 
security benefits or other protections provided by formal employment, such as paid annual and sick leave. The 
2019 Labour Force Survey estimates that of the employed population, 68.6% are in informal employment while 
31.4% are in formal employment. The unemployment rate is estimated at 12.5%, and overall is higher in rural ar-
eas (13.7%) than in urban areas (11.8%) (Zambia Statistics Agency and Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
2019). However when disaggregated by gender, the rate of unemployment for men is higher in rural areas while 
for women it is higher in urban areas (see Figure 1). 














Source: Zambia Statistics Agency and Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Labour Force Report 2019
Zambia’s policy response in terms of containing the virus was largely delivered through presidential directives. 
President Edgar Lungu gave his first public address on 25 March, announcing the closure of all bars, nightclubs 
and restaurants as well as suspension of international flights, except monitored arrivals and departures at Kenneth 
Kaunda Airport in Lusaka. Initially, the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was supportive of these meas-
ures having called for a complete lockdown, but has since reverted to critiquing the government’s approach to 
Covid-19 and broader issues of debt and poverty. Hichilema also donated soap and hand sanitiser to the fight 
against Covid-19, attracting criticism from PF that he was seeking political mileage from the situation (News Dig-
gers, 2020a). These events reflect the often personalised nature of political competition in Zambia.
In response to the impact of Covid-19 there were some quick policy moves driven mainly by the Ministries of 
Finance and Labour, with both economic and social implications. These included waiving charges for person-to-
person electronic money transfers of up to ZMW 150,1 making these transactions free of charge;2 the release of 
ZMW 500 million to the public service pensions fund to pay over 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries in an at-
tempt to reduce outstanding arrears;3 and Statutory Instrument No. 43 of 2020 signed by the Minister of Labour 
exempting employers and employees from several sections of the Employment Code Act Number 3 of 2019. 
1 Equivalent to USD 7 at the exchange rate of USD 1 = ZMW 21.2 on 11 January 2021 
2 Minister of Finance statement, 25 March 2020: https://www.zambiahc.org.uk/news_events/statement-by-the-hon-
minister-of-finance-on-covid-19/ 
3 Third National Address, 25 April 2020: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/04/25/president-lungus-full-third-
national-address-speech-on-covid-19/ 
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This aimed to make provision for the placement of employees in the formal sector on paid annual leave, limiting 
forced leave to employers in the tourism and hospitality industry and avoiding undertaking redundancy exercises. 
However, these initiatives have little impact on the informal sector, the unemployed and the poorest households. 
Education in Zambia has also been severely affected by Covid-19. The closure of schools on 17 March 
2020 has disrupted the learning of 4.2 million students across the country, and has also impacted on Zambia’s 
School Feeding Programme (SFP) leading to risk of hunger among vulnerable children. In response, the Ministry 
of General Education has put in place a contingency plan, working with partners including UNICEF and the 
Global Partnership for Education (GPE). However, in the contingency plan many of the interventions have no 
available budget allocated leaving a significant funding gap (Ministry of General Education, 2020). Through 
GPE, Zambia received a USD 10 million Covid-19 emergency grant to support remote learning where possible. 
The plan also includes the provision of alternatives for school feeding at an estimated cost of over ZMW 10 mil-
lion. However, this is one of the activities with no dedicated funds, beyond Plan International’s provision of this 
facility in six schools in Central Province, demonstrating the limitations of the response in the absence of external 
intervention. This lack of funding is particularly concerning given the potential impact of this learning disruption 
on Zambia’s young people, as over half of the population (53.4%) are under 18.4 The effects of the pandemic 
on learner outcomes are likely to put these young people’s futures and the projected ‘demographic dividend’ 
(Ministry of Finance, 2015) at risk. 
The social assistance component of Zambia’s response to Covid-19 has been driven in large part by funding 
from multilateral and bilateral donors – known in Zambia as cooperating partners or CPs. While the treasury has 
released ZMK 20 million (approximately USD 1.1 million) to the Ministry of Community Development towards 
the social protection response, the UN’s emergency appeal has so far received USD 39.1 million. This support 
covers a range of areas including health, education and food security.5 A number of donors, including the UK, 
Sweden and Germany, have channelled funds directly to emergency cash transfers. This initiative has so far been 
the main response to the food security and social protection needs of the most vulnerable and will be explored 
in more detail in the next section.
Food, FertIlIser And cAsh: the role oF emergency cAsh trAnsFers
There is a precedent in Zambia for providing emergency relief to the most vulnerable in times of crisis. During 
the droughts in the 1990s and early 2000s, this largely took the form of food aid, supported by the UN World 
Food Programme (WFP) and other donors. However, questions were raised about this approach in terms of costs 
and efficiency, disincentive effects for domestic production and the implications of introducing genetically modi-
fied maize. These concerns led Zambia to reject food aid from the US entirely in 2002 (del Ninno et al., 2007; 
Stewart, 2003; Zerbe, 2004)both for short-term emergency relief and as program food aid that helps address 
medium-term food “deficits”, is often a major component of food security strategies in developing countries. This 
study reviews the experience with food aid of four major recipients of food aid (India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and 
Zambia and donors to replace food transfers with regular cash assistance. 
Donor agencies have played a central role in promoting, financing and in some cases implementing social 
cash transfers (SCT) in Zambia, since the first pilot was introduced by the German Development Agency (GTZ) in 
2003. The coordinated and persistent efforts of a transnationalised policy coalition, including donor representa-
tives and committed technocrats within the Ministry of Community Development, positioned cash transfers as a 
credible and effective policy solution to Zambia’s high poverty levels. However, it was a perceived political threat 
that led to the scale-up of cash transfers after a decade of slow progress and resistance from politicians, dem-
onstrating the interplay between the political settlement and the policy coalition (Pruce, 2019; Pruce and Hickey, 
2019). In 2013 there was public outcry over a massive budget overspend on agricultural subsidy programmes, 
specifically the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) and the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). This prompted then 
President Michael Sata to make a statement announcing that the government was making ‘progressive decisions’ 
to remove fertiliser subsidies and that resources would be channelled to the poorest citizens (Lusaka Times, 2013). 
It was at this point that government funding of SCTs increased by 700%, suggesting the opportunistic redirection 
4 https://www.unicef.org/zambia/children-zambia 
5 Overview available at: https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/zambia/ 
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of funds from agricultural subsidies to the SCT programme. However, it is notable that both FISP and FRA remain 
in place and their budgets continue to rise. 
The SCT scheme was included in Zambia’s first National Social Protection Policy launched in 2014 (Ministry 
of Community Development, 2014), and the budget allocation was protected within the Medium Term Expendi-
ture Framework. The 700% increase in the SCT budget marked a shift as the balance of contributions was re-
versed to 75% government funding and 25% donor funding (Chilombo and van Ufford, 2015). This emboldened 
the Ministry of Community Development to take greater control and responsibility of the management of the 
SCT programme, for example making decisions about the targeting model without consulting the donors. During 
the expansion, implementation was managed by the government with donors focused mainly on financial ac-
countability and fiduciary risk, and the programme reached national coverage in 2017. However, allegations of 
embezzlement of USD 4.7 million of SCT funds being handled by ZamPost led to the sacking of the Minister of 
Community Development and the suspension of funding by the UK, Sweden and Ireland (The Guardian, 2018), 
leading to strained government-donor relations since 2018. The donors remain wary and are demanding high 
levels of accountability but are nonetheless re-engaging with the sector in the context of Covid-19 and other 
emergencies such as the recent droughts and floods experienced by the country. 
There have been several emergency cash transfers implemented in response to these crises, with varying lev-
els of connection to the existing SCT programme. For example, a joint Concern and Save the Children initiative in 
2016–2017 to address food insecurity caused by the El Nino weather pattern introduced additional staff repre-
senting the consortium at provincial and district levels. The final evaluation of this intervention rated it as efficient, 
but the coordination at district and community levels was found to be average. This included lack of involvement 
of district staff from the Department of Social Welfare, and limited engagement of the volunteer Community 
Welfare Assistance Committees (Primson Management Services, 2017). UNICEF also introduced an emergency 
cash transfer initiative, delivered through existing SCT structures, to reach registered beneficiaries affected by the 
severe drought in Southern Province in 2019–2020. 
These experiences have paved the way for emergency cash transfers (ECT) to become an additional tool in 
Zambia’s social assistance response. The Covid-19 emergency cash transfer has been the most significant social 
policy intervention to help the poorest households to cope with the effects of the pandemic in Zambia to date. On 
28 July 2020, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare launched an emergency Covid-19 
cash transfer, supported by a range of partners including ILO, WFP, UNICEF, and the World Bank. This scheme 
combines cash and food assistance by providing ZMW 400 (USD 22) per month plus food hampers for six 
months, aiming to address food insecurity and other vulnerabilities. It targets beneficiaries already enrolled in the 
social cash transfer scheme as well as additional households identified as either vulnerable or food insecure. This 
initiative forms part of the UN Zambia’s Covid-19 Emergency Appeal and will cover 18 districts, reaching an 
estimated 249,200 households (approximately 1.2 million people) in total. The regular SCT programme is also 
expanding, targeting 700,000 households in 2020, and the budget is continuing to increase. However these 
budget commitments frequently do not translate into disbursements, with the government underspending by 62% 
on the SCT programme between 2015 and 2020 (ZIPAR, 2020a). This has led to irregular and delayed pay-
ments to beneficiaries while other public spending has been increased (Siachiwena, 2017), suggesting that cash 
transfers do not yet represent an electoral priority. 
Different donors are supporting different aspects of the ECT initiative. For example, WFP is focusing on food 
insecure urban areas, including Lusaka and Kafue where infection rates have been highest. In August 2020 the 
EU committed EUR 5 million to enable WFP to extend its assistance to two more cities, Livingstone and Kitwe, with 
a view to reaching 655,000 people. This marks an expansion of coverage beyond the regular SCT programme, 
which is largely concentrated in rural areas due to higher poverty levels. An estimated 54.4% of Zambia’s popu-
lation are poor, 76.6% of whom are found in rural areas (UNICEF, 2019). However, in the context of Covid-19, 
the highest caseloads have been reported in Lusaka, Livingstone and the Copperbelt. A rapid food security as-
sessment conducted in urban and peri-urban settings found that the pandemic has affected the quantity, quality 
and diversity of meals consumed, particularly in high density and low-income areas (UNOCHA, 2020). None-
theless, Covid-19 has now reached all ten Provinces and rural areas are also at risk of food insecurity, particularly 
in the wake of a combination of droughts and floods in 2019–2020.
The World Bank has committed additional funding to the existing Girls Education and Women’s Empower-
ment and Livelihoods (GEWEL) programme, which includes credit from the International Development Associa-
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tion (IDA) and co-financing grants from the UK Department for International Development and the Swedish Inter-
national Development Association. In addition to providing secondary education for girls from poor households 
and livelihood packages for poor women, the GEWEL Project supports cash transfers to 245,000 extremely 
poor and vulnerable beneficiaries through the government’s Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programme. Childfund 
International is also spending ZMW 1.8 million to deliver cash transfers to 4,355 households in Chilanga and 
Luangwa.
While there has been some level of coordination through the UN’s emergency appeal, the level of donor in-
volvement leads to a somewhat fragmented approach as indicated in a statement by the Minister of Community 
Development (News Diggers, 2020b): 
when you look at Lusaka District, Chilanga, Kafue, Livingstone, Kitwe, all those we are cooperat-
ing with … World Food Programme (WFP), when you look at Chipata, Chililabombwe, Chirundu, 
Kalalushi, Ndola, Mufulira, Kabwe, Nakonde, Solwezi, Chingola, Mansa, Mongu, those we are 
partnering with UNICEF. When you look at Luangwa it is purely Child Fund. When you look at 
Chililabombwe, we are partnering with the Red Cross. Chisamba is Plan International. These co-
operating partners have partnered with government in different portfolios in different districts. So, if 
you ask UNICEF about Lusaka, it doesn’t know.
The statement also highlights the extent to which the emergency cash transfer is reliant on donors for funding, and 
in some cases also delivery.
the polItIcAl economy oF socIAl protectIon In ZAmbIA
As outlined in the previous section, donors have played a key role in introducing and promoting cash transfers 
as a policy idea in Zambia, with government support for the programme being determined by domestic political 
incentives, in particular political and electoral threats in the context of competitive elections (Pruce and Hickey, 
2019). Indeed, the SCT budget for 2021 (an election year) has more than doubled from just over ZMW 1 billion 
in 2020 to ZMW 2.3 billion, and the amount per household has been increased from ZMW 90 to ZMW 110 
per month (Ng’andu, 2020). This revision of the transfer amount is welcome, and long overdue, as inflation has 
increased by 150% between 2017 and 2020, reducing the value of the transfer in real terms (ZIPAR, 2020a). 
However, it may also provide basis for the claim that “President Edgar Lungu was the one gaining political mile-
age since he had risen the stakes by giving beneficiaries higher amounts of money” (News Diggers, 2020b). 
Based on performance in recent years, failure to disburse the SCT funds remains a threat and would undermine 
the government’s apparent efforts to address the effects of the country’s economic challenges on the poorest and 
most vulnerable. The government has also launched multi-sectoral youth empowerment funds in 2020, which 
feature prominently in the 2021 budget. While these are ostensibly intended to mitigate the economic impacts of 
Covid-19, previous iterations of such initiatives – such as the long-standing Youth Development Fund – have been 
found to perform poorly and be highly politicised. 
Claims that PF are using the ECT programme to gather National Registration Card (NRC) numbers for the 
purposes of election rigging are being countered by the Minister of Community Development. Suspicions arose 
when beneficiaries were being given ZMW 1,600 rather than the monthly ZMW 400 allocated by the scheme. 
The explanation provided by the Minister is that this amount is an accumulation for four months of arrears due 
to the delayed start of the scheme. However, there have also been reports of cash transfers being handed out 
directly by PF, side-lining the existing bureaucratic structures, so these concerns are not entirely allayed. The UN 
appears to be distancing itself from these events, releasing a press release on 2 September clarifying their role 
in supporting the ECTs.6
While these events suggest that cash transfer beneficiaries are of growing political importance to the ruling 
party, the more established and powerful constituency of vested interests that benefit from agricultural subsidies 
retain their enduring power. FISP therefore continues to be expanded, particularly at election times, as these 
subsidies operate both as a means of distributing state resources and rewarding loyalty in elections (Mason 
et al., 2013). The budget for the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) has been significantly increased from 
6 https://zambiareports.com/2020/09/02/press-release-un-supporting-govt-covid-19-emergency-cash-transfers/ 
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ZMW 1.1 billion in 2020 to ZMW 5.7 billion in 2021 (an election year), despite continuing complaints that it is 
being misused. In a recent Parliamentary debate,7 an MP claimed that the inputs are being mismanaged by the 
Community Agriculture Committees and farmers are not receiving enough fertiliser. The introduction of the FISP 
e-voucher (e-FISP) was supposed to improve effectiveness, including access and timeliness, but a recent study 
suggests that initially it has either had no significant effect or has negatively affected input use due to implemen-
tation challenges (Mason et al., 2020). Donors are largely opposed to such programmes, although the World 
Bank is the only agency in Zambia to have challenged the government on its use of agricultural subsidies. Despite 
claims that FISP will support one million small-scale farmers across the country (Ng’andu, 2020), the benefits of 
this spending mostly go to better-off farmers with larger landholdings, and these schemes have been shown to 
fare poorly in terms of cost-effectiveness and impacts on agricultural productivity (Tesliuc et al., 2013). Also while 
the allocation to FISP has increased by more than 400%, there is no corresponding increase in the number of 
beneficiaries (ZIPAR, 2020b), leading to concerns that the additional spending may not reach farmers at all, but 
be diverted to benefit the ruling party in the run up to the election.
The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) has also been found to transfer funds to the relatively well-off, who are net 
sellers of maize, while net purchasers – including nearly all of the poorest – are potential losers from this pro-
gramme (Tesliuc et al., 2013). The Food Reserve Bill 2020, which has now passed the committee stage, aims to 
ensure the continued existence of the FRA and redefine its functions. While strategic maize reserves undoubtedly 
play a vital role in Zambia’s food security, particularly in the face of Covid-19, the Zambian think tank Centre 
for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD) have warned that the integration of social and commercial functions 
proposed by the Bill provides scope for inefficiencies and “rent-seeking behaviour by well-connected large-
scale producers and political actors” (Lusaka Times, 2020). Studies by CTPD and others have found that while 
smallholder farmer welfare is a key goal in such maize purchase schemes, only a limited number of smallholders 
sell maize to FRA and that late payment of sellers is commonplace (CTPD, 2016; Fung et al., 2019).
conclusIon
A key recommendation by the think tank ZIPAR (Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research) in their analysis 
of the 2021 budget is that the government needs to rationalise subsidies with little visible impact, with FISP explic-
itly mentioned, in order to increase the provision of social services (ZIPAR, 2020a). However, the sustained and 
increased funding of FISP and FRA demonstrates that these agricultural subsidy programmes retain their impor-
tance within the country’s political settlement and wider distributional regime. They therefore remain a priority for 
the government, in spite of evidence that they are not achieving their goals or supporting the poorest Zambians, 
as well as the potential for misuse and politicisation. In the face of Covid-19, the government has prioritised the 
formal sector, expanded agricultural subsidies and funded high profile multi-sectoral empowerment funds. On the 
other hand, the Covid-19 emergency cash transfer targeting the poorest is heavily reliant on donor funding and 
is only a short-term intervention, but nonetheless appears to be susceptible to electioneering as Zambia moves 
towards the 2021 election.   
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AppendIx 1: socIAl polIcy developments In response to covId-19 by polIcy AreA  
(ZAmbIA, JAnuAry–september 2020) 
Policy Area Pensions Healthcare Long-term care and disability Labor market Education
(1)
Have there been any 
significant legislative 
reforms in the indicated 
policy area during the 
indicated time period?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(2)
If (1) yes, have any 
of these reforms been 
explicit responses to the 
Covid-19 pandemic?
No Yes N/A Yes Yes
(3)
If (2) yes, has there 
been significant re-
gional variation in the 
implementation of these 
reforms?
N/A Yes8 N/A No Yes
(4)
Have subnational gov-
ernments enacted any 
significant legislative 
reforms in the indicated 
policy area during the 
indicated time period?
No No No No No
Policy Area Family benefits Housing Social assistance Other*
(1)
Have there been any 
significant legislative 
reforms in the indicated 
policy area during the 
indicated time period?
No No Yes Yes
(2)
If (1) yes, have any 
of these reforms been 
explicit responses to the 
Covid-19 pandemic?
N/A N/A Yes No
(3)
If (2) yes, has there 
been significant re-
gional variation in the 
implementation of these 
reforms?
N/A N/A Yes N/A
(4)
Have subnational gov-
ernments enacted any 
significant legislative 
reforms in the indicated 
policy area during the 
indicated time period?
No No No No
* Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection, e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection.
Note: Zambia’s political system is characterised by executive dominance with significant powers invested in the President, including decree powers and 
veto rights (Burnell, 2003; Rakner, 2012).9 While legislative authority in vested in and exercised by Parliament through Bills passed by the National As-
sembly, government policy and spending is also shaped by Presidential directives and Ministerial statements. In the area of social policy, non-contributory 
social protection programmes have been introduced and implemented through non-Parliamentary reform, often with support and funding from multilateral 
and bilateral donors.  
8 Many of the healthcare reforms are supported by health sector partners, and focused on specific regions or facilities 
e.g. support for oxygen therapy supplied to hospitals in Lusaka, Mansa and Mongu only
9 Burnell, P. (2003). ‘Legislative-Executive Relations in Zambia: Parliamentary Reform on the Agenda’, Journal of Contem-
porary African Studies, 21(1), 47–68; Rakner, L. (2012). ‘Foreign aid and democratic consolidation in Zambia’, WIDER 
Working Paper No. 2012/16, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki.
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AppendIx 2: socIAl polIcy legIslAtIon In response to covId-19  
(ZAmbIA, JAnuAry–september 2020)
Note:This appendix covers all major national social policy legislation published between 1 January 2020 and 
30 September 2020. 
Law 1
(1) Number of law Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 2020
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English)
The National Pension Scheme (Pensionable Earnings) (Amendment) Regula-
tions 2020
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Don’t know
(5) Date of law’s enactment 31 December 2019
(6) Date of law’s publication 03 January 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
No
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a 
significant revision of the legislative project after 
the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
This Statutory Instrument is an amendment to the National Pension Scheme 
(Pensionable Earnings) Regulations, 2000 under the National Pension 
Scheme Act 1996 (Laws, Volume 15, Cap. 256). It contains the updated na-
tional monthly average wage, social security ceiling and social security con-
tribution tables for the period 1 January – 31 December 2020. These revisions 
take place annually and are not related to Covid-19.  
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable 
Law 1: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Pensions
(14) Brief description of reform component
This Statutory Instrument was issued to adjust the levels of pensionable earn-
ings by an index based on average earnings and raised the social security 
ceiling to ZMW 22,992. This amendment shall be read as one with the Na-
tional Pension Scheme (Pensionable Earnings) Regulations, 2000. It revokes 
and replaces Schedules 1-5 which provide the national average monthly 
wage, social security ceiling, minimum total monthly contributions, maximum 
total monthly contributions and social security contributions table for the peri-
od 1 January – 31 December 2020.  
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
This amendment only applies to formal sector employees who are contributing 
to the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA). 
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months 12 months
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
The adjustments to the national monthly average wages, the social security 
ceiling and the contributions are designed to prevent the erosion of benefits 
through a diminishment of their real value. The figures provided in the Statutory 
Instrument apply for the period of 1 January – 31 December 2020 at which 
point they will be revised again. 
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Law 1: Component 1
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Not Applicable
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable 
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The legislation determines the level of taxable earnings and therefore affects 
the contributions made by members and employers, but does not have a 
direct cost attributed to the reform. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English)
Waiving charges for person-to-person electronic money transfers of up to 
ZMW 150 
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not Applicable
(6) Date of law’s publication 26 March 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
This measure was announced by the Minister of Finance in his statement in 
March 2020 on the impact of Covid-19 on Zambia’s economy.  
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable
Law 2: Component 1
(13) Policy Area
Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social pro-
tection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection)
(14) Brief description of reform component
This reform is a waiver which makes transactions of up to ZMW 150 free of 
charge. It is part of a package of measures aimed to encourage the use of 
digital financial services. These can be categorised as economic stimulus 
measures, which also aim to prevent the spread of Covid-19 by minimising 
person-to-person contact in conducting financial transactions, decongesting 
banks and reducing the use of cash. The World Bank has identified this mea-
sure as utility and financial support, which is a form of social assistance. 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
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Law 2: Component 1
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) This is a new measure
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) This is a new measure
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Don‘t know
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) The duration of the waiver was not indicated in the announcement
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) This is a new measure
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not specified
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
In the statement by the Hon. Minister of Finance, he did not mention the cost of 
this measure which affects revenue rather than expenditure.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) Easing of liquidity: Public Service Pensions Fund
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not Applicable
(6) Date of law’s publication 24 April 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
This release of funds was announced in a statement by the Hon. Minister of 
Finance on further measures aimed at mitigating the impact of Covid-19 on the 
Zambian economy.
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable 
Law 3: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Pensions
(14) Brief description of reform component
This was one of a number of measures introduced to alleviate the economic 
pressures associated with the Covid-19-induced liquidity challenges and in 
particular to prevent liquidity constraints to financial institutions degenerating 
into a solvency problem. The government released ZMW 500 million to the 
Public Service Pensions Fund to pay over 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries.   
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Law 3: Component 1
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17)
This measure addresses outstanding arrears within the Public Services Pension 
Fund, aiming to pay 1,500 retirees or their beneficiaries who already qualify 
for the benefits but have been waiting to receive their pensions.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) See (18)
(23) Introduction of new benefits? No
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
This release of government funds was announced in a statement by the 
Minister of Finance in April 2020 and also in President Lungu’s Third Na-
tional Address. It is not clear whether this amount is additional to the ZMW 
1,020,387,712 allocated to the Public Service Pension Fund in the 2020 
budget. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4 (Contingency plan released by the Ministry of General Education)
(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) Education Contingency Plan for Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19)
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not Applicable
(6) Date of law’s publication 01 April 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
This contingency plan is specifically designed in response to Covid-19. It 
includes a series of interventions to mitigate school closures as well as an 
early recovery plan for when schools resume. The social reform components 
covered in this overview are from the immediate response plan and do not 
include the activities in the early recovery plan, which at the time of planning 
did not have any funds allocated towards their delivery.  The Global Partner-
ship for Education (GPE) has contributed USD 10 million towards the delivery 
of this plan to support radio-based learning, teacher support and returning to 
schools safely. However, the breakdown of how these funds will be spent is 
not available. 
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Law 4 (Contingency plan released by the Ministry of General Education)
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
Yes
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
10
Law 4: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Enhance awareness among children and youth through dissemination of age 
appropriate messages as supplementary to regular delivery of lessons 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months While schools are closed 
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months While schools are closed 
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months While schools are closed
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This component provides supplementary information while the regular delivery 
of lessons is suspended due to Covid-19
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not applicable as schools re-opened in September
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The details of the reform are provided in the Ministry of General Education’s 
contingency plan but no costs are included for this component.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
to a large degree
Law 4: Component 2
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Implement continuity of learning through diverse platforms with particular focus 
on disadvantaged and marginalised children and adolescents 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
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Law 4: Component 2
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
The reform introduces various new ways of delivering lessons, for examples 
through radio, TV and online learning 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The Ministry of General Education Contingency Plan estimates that the cost of 
the continuity of learning component is ZMW 127,350,539, but only ZMW 
61,292,799 is available leaving a gap of ZMW 66,057,740. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
to a large degree
Law 4: Component 3
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Implement continuity of learning for children with special education needs 
through development of relevant content, identification of appropriate plat-
forms and provision of teaching and learning materials 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months 3 months
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months 3 months
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 3 months
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This component includes the procurement and distribution of relevant materials 
and equipment to facilitate continuity of learning.
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) 
Learning has been disrupted due to Covid-19 and this reform aims to mitigate 
the impact
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allo-
cated to this component. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
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Law 4: Component 4
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Empower teachers to provide remote learner support in structured lessons 
delivered through multiple platforms as well as provide guidance on self-di-
rected learning 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Remote learner support is unique to the alternative learning methods 
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Remote learner support is unique to the alternative learning methods 
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This component provides additional support and monitoring for learners which 
is not required during normal teaching 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allo-
cated to this component. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4: Component 5
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component Community sensitisation to enhance usage of continuity of learning 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Unique to remote learning context
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Unique to remote learning context
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout remote learning period
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This component aims to enhance demand for continuity of learning through a 
new sensitisation campaign.
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
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Law 4: Component 5
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allo-
cated to this component. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4: Component 6
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Design and implement strategies for monitoring coverage and access to 
continuity learning programme 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Unique to remote learning
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Unique to remote learning
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This is not a benefit as such but is an integral part of the new remote learning 
interventions to improve access and quality, as well as prevent potential mis-
application of funds. 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but only ZMW 
237,562 has been allocated to this component, leaving a gap of ZMW 
1,114,438. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4: Component 7
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component Provision of psychosocial support to teachers, learners and parents 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Expansion
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout remote learning period
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
The provision of psychosocial support will continue throughout the period of 
remote learning while schools are closed.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
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Law 4: Component 7
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 2 weeks
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
This component includes training of guidance and counselling teachers on 
psychosocial support (through online and distance) which will last 2 weeks
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allo-
cated to this component 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4: Component 8
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Support feeding programmes through alternative mechanisms focusing on 
learners from drought/flood affected districts 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout the period of school closure
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
This component aims to continue providing school feeding to vulnerable chil-
dren through alternative means, following MoH guidance on social distanc-
ing. It will continue throughout the period of school closure.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Maintenance
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout the period of school closure
(22) Note on (19)-(21) See (18)
(23) Introduction of new benefits? No
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is allo-
cated to this component.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




Law 4: Component 9
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component Planning for remedial programme and accelerated learning 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Unique to remote learning
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Unique to remote learning
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout, as required
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
The planning and development of materials for the remedial programme and 
catch-up learning is estimated to take 1 month, then the remedial/catch up 
lessons will take place throughout, as required, during the early recovery 
phase. 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Unique to remote learning
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The estimated cost is included in the contingency plan but no funding is al-
located to this component. This cost covers the planning and development 
for this component only, while the delivery falls into the early recovery phase 
which is not covered here. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 4: Component 10
(13) Policy Area Education
(14) Brief description of reform component
Utilise some already existing interventions and good practices, facilities and 
human resource in ICT at the two ICT Centres of Excellence. 
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Expansion
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout the period of school closure 
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Not Applicable
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Expansion
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Throughout the period of school closure
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? No
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)
Estimated cost of reform in 2020  
(national currency)
Not Specified 
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Law 4: Component 10
(30)
Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
No cost is included in the immediate response plan for the use of existing ICT 
resources. In the post-recovery system strengthening plan there is some pro-
vision for procuring ICT equipment and extending access particularly in rural 
areas.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) Healthcare – support from health sector partners 
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not Applicable
(6) Date of law’s publication Not Applicable
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
The components included in this section are not part of a single reform but 
represent the most significant areas of support provided to the government by 
various health sector partners, specifically in response to Covid-19. 
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
Yes
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
6
Law 5: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Healthcare
(14) Brief description of reform component
Support for operations in the two national call centres through hiring of 
additional call centre personnel. The centres are instrumental in addressing 
concerns from the community, following contacts to cases of Covid-19 and 
risk communication
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Not Applicable
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Don‘t know
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable 
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
The response specifies hiring of call centre personnel but does not make it 
clear whether the support extends to covering their salaries. 
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Law 5: Component 1
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not specified 
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 5: Component 2
(13) Policy Area Healthcare
(14) Brief description of reform component
Support for stabilisation of oxygen therapy supplies through the rehabilitation 
of Oxygen Plants in three hospitals including University Teaching Hospital 
(UTH) Lusaka (Children Hospital) that will improve and ensure smooth avail-
ability of oxygen therapy to support the life-saving treatment of patients with 
Covid-19 and other respiratory diseases. The rehabilitation of Oxygen Plants 
in University Teaching Hospital (UTH) Lusaka was completed and is now op-
erational, while work will begin for Mansa General Hospital in Luapula and 
Lewanika General Hospital in Mongu. Sector partners organised a major visi-
bility event officially handing over 259 oxygen concentrators, 1.3 million pairs 
of gloves and more than 500,000 surgical masks to the Minister of Health.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Expansion
(16) Duration of coverage change? Indefinite
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
This response has improved existing oxygen therapy facilities in several hospi-
tals across Zambia.  
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Dependent on how long the donated supplies last 
(26) Note on (23)-(25)
The sector partners have also donated new equipment to assist with Zambia’s 
Covid-19 response. 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
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Law 5: Component 3
(13) Policy Area Healthcare
(14) Brief description of reform component
Support for the expansion of Levy Mwanawasa Hospital Bed Capacity from 
300 to 800 through the connection of power supply by Zesco.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Expansion
(16) Duration of coverage change? Indefinite
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
The response covers the expansion of the capacity of the existing Levy Mwa-
nawasa Hospital in Lusaka, which is a permanent benefit. 
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? No
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable 
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) The Zambia situation report includes a cost of USD 225,865.85 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 5: Component 4
(13) Policy Area Healthcare
(14) Brief description of reform component
Sector partners continue supporting the Government to procure and distrib-
ute supplies and commodities required for Covid-19 response in the areas 
of diagnostics, PPE and clinical management. During the reporting period: 
UNICEF procured and delivered 519,950 surgical masks, 1.3 million pairs of 
gloves, 266 sets of oxygen concentrators and 5,500 Covid-19 test kits (6880 
Cobas and Gene-Xpert) to perform 10,000 tests and donated 31 units of ox-
ygen concentrator machines that have since been installed in isolation centres. 
Donated laboratory supplies included 12,000 Viral Transport Media, 13,200 
lab test kits and 83,520 PPEs.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Not Applicable 
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Dependent on how long the donated supplies last 
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
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Law 5: Component 4
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
to a large degree
Law 5: Component 5
(13) Policy Area Healthcare
(14) Brief description of reform component
Partners donated items to refugee settlements that included 20,000 medical 
masks, 9,000 surgical gloves for the use of some 70 health care workers in 12 
health facilities across three settlements (Mayukwayukwa, Mehebe and Man-
tapala), eight megaphones (being donation from NCA) to reinforce commu-
nity sensitisation activities in above locations. Donated Essential Reproductive 
Health Commodities to the MOH including IUDs (12 months of stock), DMPA 
SC (2.5 months of stock), Combined Oral Contraceptives (6 months of stock), 
Noristerat (2.2 months of stock) worth USD 2.1 million.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) Not Applicable 
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Dependent on how long the donated supplies last 
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) Not Applicable
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) The Zambia situation report includes a cost of USD 2.1 million. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
to a large degree
Law 5: Component 6
Policy Area Healthcare
Brief description of reform component
Continuation of essential health services, standard vaccines (BCG, bOPV, Td 
and MR) for the entire country’s three months’ requirement was procured and 
delivered. Procurement order for another six months’ requirement has been 
placed.
Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
27 / 32CRC 1342 Covid-19 Social Policy Response Series / No. 9 – Zambia
Law 5: Component 6
If fix-term, duration in months 9 months
Note on (15)-(17)
This response aims to support the government to continue accessing essential 
health services and vaccines for a period of nine months 
Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
Note on (19)-(21) Not Applicable
Introduction of new benefits? No
Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable 
Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable 
Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
Note on (27) Not Applicable
Estimated cost of reform in 2020  
(national currency)
Not specified
Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
Source of cost estimation Other
Note (29)-(31) The costs are not included in the Zambia situation report.
If the implementation of the reform should already 
have started, has the reform been implemented?
to a large degree
Law 6
(1) Number of law Statutory Instrument No. 48 of 2020
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) The Employment Code (Exemption) Regulations 2020
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Don’t know
(5) Date of law’s enactment 08 May 2020
(6) Date of law’s publication 08 May 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
This Statutory Instrument provides numerous exemptions to the Employment 
Code Act No. 3 of 2019, in order to regulate employment and labour market 
relationships in the context of Covid-19. However, in a press statement the 
Minister of Labour and Social Security explained that the Statutory Instrument 
also supersedes the annual leave benefits formula as reflected in the Employ-
ment Code Act, as that formula contains a fundamental error where the orig-
inally intended division sign was replaced with a bracket. The error can only 
be resolved through an amendment of the Act. 
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable
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Law 6: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Labor market
(14) Brief description of reform component
This Statutory Instrument provides numerous exemptions from the Employment 
Code Act No. 3 of 2019. These include exemptions of all employers and 
employees from the provisions of section 36 which deals with annual leave 
because the section does not take into account the alternative of carrying 
forward leave days. Also the exemption of all employers and employees from 
the provisions of section 37 which deals with the calculations of annual leave 
benefits. It also indicates that some employers have been exempted from 
the provisions of section 48 where an employer is financially incapacitated, 
stating that the application for exemption shall be made to the office of the 
Labour Commissioner and certain criteria shall apply. Furthermore it exempts 
an employer from complying with the redundancy notice period set out in 
section 55 (2), where the employer proves financial incapacity to the Labour 
Commissioner and demonstrates the extreme urgency of undertaking the 
redundancy exercise immediately in line with the criteria in Resolution number 
(3) above. The employer may be granted a waiver relating to the notice 
period provided that the employees are paid in lieu of notice.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Retrenchment
(16) Duration of coverage change? Don‘t know
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) The Statutory Instrument does not include a timeframe or a date for review.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Retrenchment
(20) Duration of generosity change? Don‘t know
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) See (18)
(23) Introduction of new benefits? No
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) Not Applicable
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Yes
(28) Note on (27) 
Although the exemptions included in the Statutory Instrument were agreed at 
a Tripartite Consultative Labour Council meeting, they are likely to reduce the 
protection for employees for example in the area of redundancy. 
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Not Applicable
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) Not Applicable
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Don‘t know
Law 7 (New social protection intervention not covered by legislation)
(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) Emergency Covid-19 social cash transfer scheme
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment 28 July 2020
(6) Date of law’s publication 28 July 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 
as a motivation in the law or any accompany-
ing text?
Yes
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Law 7 (New social protection intervention not covered by legislation)
(8)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Yes
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a 
significant revision of the legislative project after 
the initial parliamentary motion?
Not Applicable
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
While the emergency cash transfer programme is not included in any leg-
islation, it is clearly a response to Covid-19. The programme is the result of 
collaboration between the UN, other donors and the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Welfare. It has been incorporated into the existing 
UN Joint Programme on Social Protection (UNJPSP) under the shock-respon-
sive social protection outcome. 
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable
Law 7: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Social assistance
(14) Brief description of reform component
The emergency cash transfer is designed as both a food security and 
multi-sectoral cash intervention. The scheme provides ZMW 400 (USD 22) 
per month in cash plus food hampers for a period of six months. It targets 
existing beneficiaries already enrolled in the social cash transfer scheme as 
well as additional households identified as either vulnerable or food insecure, 
particularly in high-density and low-income urban and peri-urban areas. In 
total, the Covid-19 ECT programme aims to cover 18 districts and reach an 
estimated 249,200 households (approximately 1.2 million people).
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Expansion
(16) Duration of coverage change? Fix-term
(17) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
The emergency cash transfer will extend coverage beyond existing beneficia-
ries of the social cash transfer to include additional households identified as 
either vulnerable or food insecure.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Expansion
(20) Duration of generosity change? Fix-term
(21) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
For some existing beneficiaries of social cash transfers, the emergency cash 
transfer programme will provide additional cash and also food hampers 
which are not included with the regular transfers.  
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Fix-term
(25) If fix-term, duration in months 6 months
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
For households that are not currently receiving the social cash transfer, the 
emergency cash transfer will provide new benefits in the form of cash and 
food hampers for a limited period of 6 months.
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? No
(28) Note on (27) The emergency cash transfer is not removing or reducing any existing benefits. 
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
Currently ending December 2020
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
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Law 7: Component 1
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The cost estimation is based on UN Zambia’s report on contributions to the 
GRZ Covid-19 Multi-sectoral Contingency Plan and Recovery Efforts which 
includes an overview of UN Socio-Economic Donor Engagements. Accord-
ing to this report, KFW, the European Union, DFID, Sweden and Ireland 
have either committed or pledged to support the Covid-19 Emergency Cash 
Transfers with the combined amount totalling ZMW 352,993,056. There is no 
reference to a government contribution within this report. 
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




(1) Number of law Not Applicable
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) Presidential Youth Empowerment Fund
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion Not Applicable
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not Applicable
(6) Date of law’s publication 15 August 2020
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
Not Applicable
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
Not Applicable
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
The Presidential announcement did not mention Covid-19, but rather focused 
on the need to provide opportunities for young people in the context of high 
youth unemployment. Cheques were distributed directly to youth groups 
across the country. However, the initiative has been criticised for not being 
linked to the 2015 National Youth Policy and for falling short of being a sus-
tainable empowerment initiative. 
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable
Law 8: Component 1
(13) Policy Area Labor market
(14) Brief description of reform component
The President announced a Youth Empowerment Fund to support youth entre-
preneurs and a separate scheme targeting young artists. He also called on 
Ministers and councils to avail land to young entrepreneurs and to support 
them with business ideas.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(16) Duration of coverage change? Not Applicable
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
The Youth Empowerment Fund was presented as a new initiative, despite the 
existence of a Youth Development Fund established in 2000 which provided 
loans to youth beneficiaries but with a very low loan recovery rate.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) See section (18)
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Yes
(24) Duration of new benefits? Indefinite
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(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
The announcement provided no specific time frame for support. A budget 
line for the Youth Empowerment Fund has been included in the 2021 budget 
statement, but the amount is much lower than the 2020 allocation of ZMW 
500 million. 
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(28) Note on (27) See section (18)
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
ZMW 155,237,025
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
The ZMW 500 million for 2020 was announced by President Lungu although 
there is no budget line for Youth Empowerment Funds in the 2020 budget. The 
2021 budget statement does include Youth Empowerment Funds but at the 
much lower figure of ZMW 155,237,025.  
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 




(1) Number of law Bill No. 6 of 2020
(2) Name of law (original language) Not Applicable
(3) Name of law (English) The Food Reserve Bill 2020
(4) Date of first parliamentary motion 01 July 2020
(5) Date of law’s enactment Not yet enacted
(6) Date of law’s publication Not yet published
(7)
Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned 




Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
the initial parliamentary motion for this law?
No
(9)
Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for 
a significant revision of the legislative project 
after the initial parliamentary motion?
No
(10) Note on (7)-(9) 
The introduction of a Bill to amend the Food Reserve Act 1995 was approved 
in principle by Parliament in 2018.  It is not directly related to Covid-19 but has 
implications for the operation of Zambia’s strategic food reserves, which play 
an important role in food security particularly during crises such as Covid-19 
and the droughts/floods Zambia has been experiencing in recent years.
(11)
Was this law a legislative package that con-
tained multiple social reform components?
No
(12)
If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform 
components did it contain?
Not Applicable
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(13) Policy Area
Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social pro-
tection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection)
(14) Brief description of reform component
The Food Reserve Bill 2020 proposes to extend the existence of the Food 
Reserve Agency (Agency) by redefining and extending its functions. It also 
allows the Agency to integrate social functions of maintaining strategic grains 
on the one hand and commercial functions of grain marketing driven by prof-
itability potential on the other. The Bill will allow the Agency to identify, enter 
and operate markets in rural areas; establish or determine prices and create 
a market for a designated agricultural commodity in rural areas; and enter a 
domestic market that may be identified by the Agency. This will have the effect 
of extending the mandate of the Agency beyond the social role of maintaining 
a strategic grain reserve and expand its role to a commercial player in the 
grain market.
(15) Change in coverage of existing benefits? Maintenance
(16) Duration of coverage change? Indefinite
(17) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(18) Note on (15)-(17) 
The Bill will continue the existence of a strategic grain reserve in Zambia to 
ensure a reliable supply of a designated agricultural community for the coun-
try and respond to food emergencies caused by natural disasters.
(19) Change in generosity of existing benefits? Not Applicable
(20) Duration of generosity change? Not Applicable
(21) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(22) Note on (19)-(21) 
The Bill makes provisions for the quantity of the designated agricultural 
commodity to be determined by the Agency based on: lean period; human 
consumption; industrial requirement; livestock requirements; mobilisation of 
resources; importation period; climate change; or any other factor that the 
Agency may determine. Therefore the generosity of the benefit is not fixed.
(23) Introduction of new benefits? Not Applicable
(24) Duration of new benefits? Not Applicable
(25) If fix-term, duration in months Not Applicable
(26) Note on (23)-(25) 
The main benefits of the scheme remain the availability of strategic food re-
serves in case of shortfall or emergency and support for smallholder farmers 
who are able to sell their maize to the Agency.
(27) Cuts of existing benefits? Don‘t know
(28) Note on (27) 
The Bill aims to continue and extend the existence of the Food Reserve Agen-
cy, integrating commercial functions with government funding of the national 
strategic grain reserve. It is not yet clear how this will affect the quantity and 
prices of commodities, and whether buyers and sellers will gain or lose out. 
(29)




Estimated cost of reform in 2021  
(national currency)
ZMW 517,500,000
(31) National Currency Code (ISO 4217) ZMW 967
(32) Source of cost estimation Other
(33) Note (29)-(31) 
These figures are from the 2020 and 2021 budget statements delivered by 
the Minister of Finance. The reduction in the amount allocated in the 2021 
budget may be attributed to reduced dependence of the Food Reserve Agen-
cy on government funding implied by the provision in the Bill for the Agency to 
enter domestic markets. The Bill also allows the Agency to receive donations 
of commodities and then sell them on.
(34)
If the implementation of the reform should 
already have started, has the reform been 
implemented?
Not Applicable
